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Comparative Analysis & Strategy: 
Policy Instruments for Renewable 
Energy in Oregon 
 
 
Oregon's energy system is evolving to reflect the stated legislative priorities of 
decarbonization, decentralization, and diversification. This report outlines several 
policy instruments (Renewable Portfolio Standards, Net Metering & 
Interconnection Standards, Tax Incentives, Public Benefit Funds, and Energy 
Efficiency Standards) available to the state, their alignment with the stated goals 
of the state, their utilization and effectiveness in other states, and the political 
considerations surrounding their implementation in the State of Oregon. This 
report concludes with suggested policy package considerations to further these 
goals in the current political climate. 
 
 
Gabrielle A. Brown 
Portland State University 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1975, the Oregon legislature established the Oregon Department of 
Energy with the statement, “It is essential that future generations not be left a legacy 
of vanished or depleted resources…” (ORS 469.010). This legislation established 
the following principles as the Department of Energy’s core mandate (O.L. 1975 
c.606 §1): 
 
• “Provide leadership on energy conservation, renewable 
energy and protection of the Columbia River from 
radioactive waste at Hanford; 
• Engage in energy planning and siting of energy facilities; 
• Promote conservation and renewable energy projects 
through a variety of programs; 
• Research emerging energy technologies; and 
• Provide educational and technical assistance to industry 
professionals and the public.” 
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In the decades since, Oregon’s energy policies have undergone rapid 
change, but these fundamental principles have continued to guide state energy 
policy. Generation has continued to be dominated by hydroelectric sources, but 
there has been significant movement towards a more sustainable and decentralized 
electric grid. The last decades have seen the closure of Oregon’s nuclear generation 
facilities and an increase in natural gas and wind power. In 2016, the Oregon 
legislature passed SB 1547, requiring providers to discontinue purchasing of fossil 
fuel-based energy, and in 2020, the Boardman coal generation facility is scheduled 
for closure.  
 
These developments have made Oregon a leader in sustainable energy, but 
much work remains if Oregon is to reach the goals established by the state to 
decarbonize, decentralize, and diversify Oregon’s energy generation ecosystem. 
 
As of 2018, hydroelectric power continues to be the largest generation 
medium in the state, accounting for roughly 40% of all energy generated. And while 
hydroelectric is a low-carbon source of energy, it is concentrated along the 
Columbia River, which makes it vulnerable to a plethora of exogenous shocks 
including the possibility of seismic events and terrorist threats (Chen et al 2012, 
198). As such, while it is certainly a core component of a decarbonized energy 
ecosystem, but it does not aid the goals of decentralized and diversified energy 
mediums. 
 
The Boardman coal power plant, despite accounting for around a third of 
all of Oregon’s generation capacity, runs counter to all three of the stated goals. It 
is the largest single-point greenhouse gas source in the state. It is currently 
scheduled for closure in 2020 (Dooris 2019), but its loss leaves open questions as 
to where the imported energy that will need to fill the gap will come from. 
 
Natural gas is the next largest generation medium at roughly 17%, and while 
certainly cleaner than its fossil fuel predecessors and more decentralized than 
Oregon’s hydroelectric or coal facilities, it still creates carbon emissions in excess 
of the state’s long-term limits. 
 
Renewables currently make up about 8% of the state’s generation capacity 
with 6.5% coming from wind power. This represents a 741% increase in wind 
energy since 2004 (Oregon Department of Energy 2018, 9). If trends continue, it 
will represent a sizable impact on statewide carbon emissions and diversity in 
Oregon’s energy portfolio, but it is also at present largely isolated to the Columbia 
Gorge region. 
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Over the last 20 years, Oregon’s energy generation ecosystem has become 
more diverse, more decentralized, and lower carbon-producing, but the state 
remains behind carbon goals and vulnerable to shock from its high reliance on the 
Columbia Valley for energy production. This report outlines several policy options 
available to the state, their alignment with the stated goals of the state, their 
utilization and effectiveness in other states, and the political considerations 
surrounding their implementation in the state of Oregon. For the purposes of this 
report, we will discuss the following energy policies: 
 
• Renewable Portfolio Standards 
• Net Metering & Interconnection Standards 
• Tax Incentives 
• Public Benefit Funds 
• Energy Efficiency Standards 
 
For the sake of this report, we will categorize these policies within the 
NATO typological framework established by Christopher Hood (1983) to help 
elucidate the formal mechanisms that enable the implementation of each. Under 
this framework, policies are codified into four distinct (but often overlapping) 
typologies. Typologies are either coercive or persuasive. The coercive powers of 
Authority (A) include regulation and prescriptive policies while Treasure (T) 
include fiscal incentives and penalties. The persuasive powers include Nodality 
(N), which refer to information-based power such as the formulation of scorecards, 
warnings, and labeling, and Organization (O), which includes coordinating and 
management tools. 
 
Finally, a discussion of energy policy packages would not be complete 
without a discussion of the actors and interests relevant to each policy tool. While 
the direct institutional actors include the Governor and the Department of Energy 
in the Executive Branch as well as the state legislature, each policy tool also has 
unique impacts on various interest groups and actors which may affect their 
feasibility within the Oregon socio-political ecosystem. These more specific policy 
actors will be addressed for each policy tool and summed in the final section on 
strategic considerations. 
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Policy Instruments 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) establish targets for renewable 
energy, either in generation or in consumption. Oregon’s RPS was established by 
SB 838 in 2007 and updated by SB 1547 in 2016. It mandates that investor-owned 
utilities derive 50% of their energy from renewable sources by 2040 (25% by 2025 
for consumer-owned utilities). As a coercive Authority-based tool, it leverages the 
power of regulation to distort market functions to realize goals. 
 
Carley (2011b, 269) notes that RPS does generally achieve the stated goals 
of decarbonization, decentralization, and diversification, though not often all three 
at once. In the case of diversification, results tend to be quite dependent on 
enforcement and policy stability. Decentralization likewise tends to be dependent 
on concurrent policy in other dimensions, such as tax-credits for small-scale 
generation. RPS policies do tend to lead to a higher percentage of power generation 
from low-carbon sources as long as the incentives and penalties are strong enough 
to drive compliance. 
 
Most states currently have RPS regulations on the books. However, they 
can vary widely in terms of both goals and effectiveness. Much of this variation can 
be attributed to variability in policy design, implementation, and enforcement. 
Some states have seen a tremendous amount of success when the policy has strict 
enforcement procedures and a stable political environment. Those states that have 
light enforcement, significant carve-outs, or frequent change or alteration to their 
RPS policies have generally been less effective at achieving their sustainable goals. 
 
In general, RPS is the low-hanging fruit of sustainable energy policy. It 
shows a high amount of political feasibility since RPS policies come without 
upfront price tags and have time horizons that allow for ramp-up effects, lowering 
the burden (and therefore political backlash) at the time of policy consideration. 
Further, instead of increasing the cost of existing energy products, they tend to 
decrease the cost of renewable sources in the long run as energy providers increase 
renewable generation.  
 
In the specific case of Oregon, the policy has likely been successful so far 
as renewable production has consistently increased and thus far seen relatively little 
political pushback. Further, with the closing of the Boardman coal plant, energy 
companies will likely increase their energy purchasing and production from low-
4
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carbon sources, reducing long-run costs for those energy mediums. Finally, 
Oregon’s geography and historic power mix creates a distinct advantage in this 
area. The Columbia River Gorge is a viable source of significant wind power; the 
geography east of the Cascades presents ample opportunity for commercial solar 
projects; and the state has a long history of utilizing hydroelectric power throughout 
the state. It is worth noting however that not all hydroelectric power is eligible for 
the state’s Renewable Energy Certificates. Only new small hydroelectric facilities 
or electricity from older facilities attributable to efficiency upgrades after 1995 or 
from those that have been certified as low-impact facilities after 1995 (Oregon, 
n.d.) can be counted towards RPS figures. This policy instrument also has few 
opposing interests and broad electoral support, creating a stable and positive 
political environment. 
Net Metering & Interconnection Standards 
Oregon established net metering and interconnection standards in 2005, 
allowing Oregon residents and companies to generate distributed energy on-site and 
sell it back to the utility during generation surpluses. Both are coercive Authority-
based instruments that mandate that utility providers offer bidirectional meter 
installation at no charge and purchase power from distributed sites if their 
production exceeds consumption. 
 
Net metering and interconnection standards do help achieve the primary 
goals directly. However, even cumulatively, their impact may be relatively low. Of 
the three, their greatest impact is to the goal of decentralization. By creating a 
profundity of micro-generation points, the whole system is less vulnerable to 
negative impacts including cascading effects. However, the amount generated is 
small and requires an appropriate distribution network from the wheel-and-spoke 
system typical of large-point generation. These policies also tend to create greater 
diversity in power generation. While many are photovoltaic arrays utilized by 
single homes or commercial facilities, biomass is also common. And since most 
distributed power generation is photovoltaic (slightly less than 50% compared to 
less than 1% of utility production), it is generally low carbon. 
 
While net metering and interconnection standards are broadly common 
among states today, these distributed systems account for a very small percentage 
of total power demand, and even that varies widely state to state. Forsyth (2002, 
12) found that net metering and interconnection standards were generally not 
enough in and of themselves to promote the production of such distributed systems 
and that complementary policies were a primary factor in the efficacy of such 
programs. Limits on the size of such systems (bottom or top) can drastically affect 
5
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the propagation of distributed systems (NNEC 2008, 8 and 21), as can fees and tax-
incentives that make barriers to distributed system production higher or lower. 
 
In Oregon’s case, an array of policy packages has addressed these systems, 
from the 2005 legislation to various grant and subsidies established at both state 
and local levels to incentivize both private residents and commercial facilities to 
install on-site power generation. The primary advantage of net metering and 
interconnection standards is that the costs are primarily placed on utility providers 
and not state coffers, but this advantage comes with additional implicit costs if it is 
to be effective.  
 
In addition to its relatively low impact on overall energy generation, 
additional incentives often must accompany such initiatives. Grants and tax 
incentives for the capital costs of installation of such systems are expensive relative 
to the impact, and narrow in regard to the number of people able to take advantage 
of them. Further, depending on structure, such policy packages can engender 
antipathy from powerful utilities and taxpayers who pay for the programs while 
those that directly benefit from them are few, generally wealthier, and distributed 
widely across the state.  
Tax Incentives 
Tax incentive regimes have a multitude of configurations, from small-scale 
residential subsidies to large capital subsidies and cap and trade configurations. By 
leveraging the persuasive Organization and coercive Treasure powers of the state, 
such instruments have a range of applications and effects. As Treasure powers, the 
state can create incentives for particular activities and investments within the 
market, and with the Organization powers, the state can create new market 
mechanisms that organize and direct market effects. 
 
Oregon currently has a number of tax incentives on the books, ranging from 
property tax abatements to capital subsidies for energy projects, both small-scale 
and local as well as large-scale utility projects. Further, the state has been 
considering a more profound tax incentive program in the form of cap and trade, 
though that was defeated in 2019. 
 
Though generalizations about tax incentives are difficult given their 
diversity in both scale and typology, they can help meet all three goals if formulated 
well. By incentivizing renewable power generation at any scale, they theoretically 
align with decarbonization goals. However, there are risks including leakage 
(where the price for high-carbon generation falls due to falling demand, only to be 
purchased out of state) (Bushnell et al 2007, 10) and free-rider issues (where those 
6
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that might have purchased renewable technologies anyway take advantage of 
subsidies (Geller 2002, 60). If formulated correctly, they do deliver decentralization 
when the incentives are targeted at small-scale projects and diversity when they 
target renewable and alternative energy sources. 
 
According to Carley (2011b, 277), tax incentives are most effective when 
paired with other policy tools, so their efficacy in other states shows wide 
variability depending on supporting policy environments. However, their smaller 
and controllable costs can make them efficient tools. 
 
In Oregon, subsidies for renewables and other incentives are generally 
popular, though larger programs such as cap and trade have experienced significant 
political pushback, especially from the industrial and manufacturing sectors. In 
order to produce the desired effects within the market, they are better targeted in 
ways that make their costs transparent and capped as opposed to profound 
reconfigurations of the state energy market. 
Public Benefit Funds 
Public Benefit Funds are programs intended to drive revenue to renewable 
power or energy efficiency projects. Energy Trust of Oregon is this state’s public 
benefit fund, which was instituted by SB 1149 in 1999 and created a 3% surcharge 
on electric-utility bills. From this revenue, various energy efficiency programs, 
small-scale renewable projects, and low-income and K-12 school energy-
conservation programs are funded. 
 
At present, there is not enough research to draw conclusions as to the 
efficacy of these programs towards the goals of decentralization or diversification, 
as most are targeted towards the marketplace side and vary widely in their policy 
contours, goals, and directives. These programs were most effective at increasing 
energy efficiency, which might lower-high carbon energy source demand, but this 
only bears on decarbonization depending on utility energy mix in any given 
jurisdiction. 
 
Whereas the previous three policy instruments have been widely tested in 
various state contexts, these funds exist in only 18 states plus Washington, D.C., 
and within those jurisdictions, they vary widely. The benefits of these programs are 
a notable efficacy in increasing energy efficiency and the fact that they are generally 
funded by users, not through taxes. However, in order to be effective, 
administrative efficiency has tremendous bearing as does the propensity for these 
funds to be “raided” for other uses. In Oregon, the Energy Trust program is 
generally seen as a success, or at least generates very little political opposition. 
7
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However, significant increases in the scale of the program could engender increased 
opposition as users see increased direct costs. 
Energy Efficiency Standards 
Energy Efficiency Standards (EES) mandate utilities enact strategies to 
increase energy efficiency. Depending on language, these tools are both coercive 
and persuasive in nature, incorporating typological elements of Authority, 
Nodality, and Organization. Oregon implemented an EES strategy in 2010, 
mandating an approximately 1.3% increase in energy efficiency by Oregon utilities 
(ACEEE 2019, 7). This program is administrated by the Energy Trust of Oregon. 
 
Since these programs operate at the utility level, their impact on 
decentralization and diversity is entirely dependent on the utility-level operations. 
However, like Public Benefit Funds, they do have a modest impact on 
decarbonization by reducing energy demand generally, especially when adherence 
is mandated instead of voluntary. 
 
There is limited information on their efficacy in various state contexts as 
they are a relatively novel instrument. Nadel (2006, 41) did show however that 
states that had implemented them performed well compared to those that did not 
(especially those with mandated adherence instead of voluntary). 
 
The primary political benefit of these programs is that the onus is entirely 
on utilities for compliance with no tax funds necessary and utilities are often 
favorable as these programs lower their delivery costs in the long run, making them 
highly political feasible. 
 
Strategic Considerations & Policy Package Recommendation 
The fact that Oregon has successfully implemented all of these policies in 
some form or another over the last few decades speaks both to the State’s position 
as a leader in sustainable energy and to its political will for enacting sustainable 
energy practices. There is a foreseeable limit though given the animosity that has 
arisen around the state’s attempt to implement a cap and trade program. However, 
it is reasonable to infer that much of the opposition to that legislation was related 
to the perceived increases in energy and compliance costs, especially in rural 
Oregon and among Oregon’s industrial sectors, as opposed to opposition to pricing 
carbon emissions per se. Further, there is evidence that Oregon is reaching a point 
of diminishing returns. In parts of the state, existing infrastructure for distributed 
solar power and net metering is reaching its capacity limits (Profita 2020). 
8
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As such, at this time it would be reasonable for the State of Oregon to 
proceed incrementally, tweaking the existing policy program by increasing 
renewable and distributed generation tax-incentives or increasing energy efficiency 
standards as opposed to wholesale changes until infrastructure capacity and social 
dynamics catch up. Further, with the closure of Boardman imminent, there may be 
unforeseen pitfalls ahead that could complicate new measures, especially more 
ambitious ones, until the fallout of that event is better understood. Looking at the 
political energy landscape, the best opportunities may be through increased tax 
incentives or modest increases in Public Benefit Fund contributions. These targeted 
investments could be aimed at increasing distributed generation, both in Oregon’s 
cities, where it is politically congruent as well as more rural areas, where it could 
decrease transmission infrastructure dependence and vulnerability all the while 
incentivizing self-sufficiency where that ethos is most encouraged. 
 
Large utility-scale increases in renewable energy will be more difficult in 
the near-term as increased wind power is increasingly facing opposition (as well as 
saturation in the Columbia Gorge), nuclear power is broadly considered dangerous 
(though this conception is debatable), and large-scale solar still remains less than 
ideally cost-effective, infrastructure capacity-limited, and geographically limited to 
the eastern half of the state. 
 
In sum, while Oregon has long been a leader in renewable energy, it is 
reaching a point of diminishing returns, where major improvements will be harder 
to come by, more expensive, and require major infrastructure investments. 
Profound, far-reaching legislation such as cap and trade or the reintroduction of 
nuclear power may not be broadly popular or politically feasible at this particular 
moment in time. However, by focusing on smaller projects that remain popular and 
relatively cost-effective, Oregon can meet its stated goals of a more diverse, 
decentralized, and decarbonized energy environment until the evolution of the 
political landscape unlocks the potential for more structural changes to the state’s 
energy policy. 
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